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INTRODUCTION 
Once a criminal investigation has identified a suspect, and adver­
sarial proceedings have begun, the Sixth Amendment 1 confers a right 
to be represented by counsel at the "critical stages " of the process.2 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the government cannot cir­
cumvent this requirement merely by designating a civilian informant 
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy a right . . .  to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 224 (1967). See generally James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the 
Right to Counsel Against Informants, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 9-22 (1988) (providing 
history and development of this right). The beginning of adversarial proceedings, roughly 
indictment or arraignment, has been the subject of some litigation. See, e.g., United States v. 
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (holding that right had not vested for prisoners in administra­
tive segregation). This Note does not address the separate issues surrounding when the right 
to counsel vests, but instead considers only the defendants in whom the right has vested. Re­
gardless of any lack of clarity at the margins, almost all jail inmates do have a Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel: an individual may not be held for a long period without a judicial de­
termination of probable cause, at which point the right vests. See infra note 41. 
2525 
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to engage in questioning on its behalf.3 Less clear is when the 
government is responsible for the actions of an informant; particularly 
in the case of jailhouse informants, incarcerated individuals who ques­
tion fellow inmates, government responsibility is a difficult issue for 
which no clear legal standard has emerged.4 An examination of federal 
appellate and state supreme court case law reveals two distinct factors 
that courts accord the most weight in making their decisions: the 
agreement between the informant and the government, and the gov­
ernment's targeting of a particular defendant. Federal appellate and 
state supreme courts disagree about whether one, both, or either are 
required.5 
The relevant Sixth Amendment principle was first articulated in 
1964 in United States v. Massiah.6 The defendant was a merchant 
seaman accused of possession of narcotics, and released on bail.7 
Unbeknownst to him, government agents had struck a deal with his 
co-defendant to allow them to install a radio transmitter in his car and 
listen in on their conversation. 8 The court held that the defendant's 
"Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the use in evidence against 
him of incriminating statements which Government agents had delib­
erately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in absence of 
his retained counsel. "9 This is the core Massiah standard. 
In 1980, the Court applied this rule to jailhouse informants in 
United States v. Henry, 10 holding that the government's use of an 
informant to elicit information from a postindictment jailmate violated 
the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Massiah. Looking at the 
circumstances, the Court determined that the government, and not the 
informant, had responsibility for creating a situation in which it was 
likely that information would be elicited from the accused in violation 
3. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); 
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); United States v. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); 
Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values: 
Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 422-31 (2000) 
(discussing jailhouse informant cases). 
4. See United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing circuit split); 
United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 847 (N.D. Iowa 2002) ("[L]ower courts have 
combed the Supreme Court's decisions and other sources for indicia of agency for Massiah 
purposes."); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 8 ("Massiah doctrine is anything but the picture of 
clarity."). 
5. See infra notes 33-37. 
6. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
7. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202. 
8. Id. at 202-03. 
9. Id. at 204. The Massiah Court held this action to be a violation of both the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments, but the Court later clarified that the right rests in the Sixth Amendment. 
See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272-73 (1980). 
10. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
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of the Sixth Amendment. 1 1  The FBI agent "must have known" that the 
informant would question the defendant in the absence of counsel. 1 2  
The Court thus focused on the government's responsibility - as 
determined by what it "must have known" - not the informant's 
actions. 
In 1986, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson,13 the Court held that the 
government does not offend the Sixth Amendment by using a passive 
informant who asks no questions of the accused, 1 4  settling the "listen­
ing post" question, which Henry had left open. 1 5  There was no ques­
tion that the state was responsible for the informant's actions. 1 6  Thus, 
where the government is responsible for the actions of an informant, 
the informant's behavior must constitute active elicitation 1 7  to violate 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 1 8  
The fundamental standard remains constant in these cases: the 
state is prohibited from deliberately eliciting incriminating infor­
mation to further its case after indictment in the absence of counsel -
directly or indirectly. 1 9  In the jailhouse context, lower courts have 
broken this standard into two prongs. The first prong focuses on 
government responsibility for the informant's actions; the second part 
focuses on whether the informant's elicitation was active. 2 0  
1 1 .  The Court noted that the agents who contacted the informant were working on the 
robbery of which the defendant was accused. Henry, 447 U.S. at 266. They had interviewed 
the defendant the day they contacted the informant, and the defendant had exercised his 
right to terminate the interview. Id. at 266 n.1. One of the agents testified that he had asked 
the informant to be alert for statements from the defendant, but not to question him. Id. at 
268. 
12. Id. at 271. 
13. 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
14. Wilson, 477 U.S. at 456. 
15. 447 U.S. at 271 n.9. 
16. A police detective placed the informant in the defendant's cell to determine confed­
erates' identities and instructed him to gather information passively. See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 
439. 
17. Id. at 456. This Note does not address active elicitation, an issue that has engendered 
its own line of cases. Roughly speaking, after Wilson, the informant could make remarks in 
response to the defendant's spontaneous statements about the crime (commenting that the 
defendant's story "didn't sound too good"), but could not make statements or ask questions 
designed to get an incriminating response from the defendant. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387 (1977) (holding that a police officer's "Christian burial speech" constituted deliber­
ate elicitation of information about the location of a murder victim in light of defendant's 
known vulnerability to religious concerns); Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevita­
bility Without Active Pursuit: Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238, 248-52 (2000) (giving background 
and subsequent history of the Brewer case). 
18. Wilson, 477 U.S. at 456. 
19. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 ;  Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204. 
20. See United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1355 (7th Cir. 1991); Depree v. Thomas, 
946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 
2528 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :2525 
There is substantially less guidance for the first prong of the 
inquiry than for the second prong.21 Although sometimes referred to 
as "agency, "2 2 the first prong's analysis is more analogous to state 
action 2 3  than to commercial agency.2 4 The Sixth Amendment inquiry, 
like the state action inquiry, focuses on the government's unique 
constitutional obligation. 2 5  Lower courts generally agree that the 
fundamental concern is to distinguish the situation in which the state 
has deliberately elicited information in violation of the Massiah right 
to counsel, and the one in which an enterprising informant or good 
1987); In re Neely, 864 P.2d 474, 481 (Cal. 1993); State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 1211 ,  1217 (Idaho 
1995); State v. Hernandez, 842 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. App. 1992). 
This Note does not address the second prong, which focuses on what the informant must 
do to violate the right to counsel. Wilson supplied the answer to that question in requiring 
active elicitation. Wilson, 477 U.S. at 456. 
21. See United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1015 (10th Cir. 1986) ("We have been 
unable to find any brightline test for determining whether an individual is a Government 
agent for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 
132, 135 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Supreme Court has not addressed the agency 
issue directly in the Massiah context); supra note 4. 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995). Although not a 
jailhouse case, Li offers a good example of the difficulty with agency analysis. There, the 
informant had exchanged information for a reward on several past occasions. The informant 
then contacted the government and learned that the defendant had already been indicted. 
He also told the government of his intended meeting with the defendant. Id. at 327. None­
theless, the court rejected the Massiah claim because "(t]he evidence demonstrated no 
government control over . . .  [the informant's] actions." Id. at 328. Yet, whether the 
informant was more akin to an agent or an independent contractor, the ultimate action, 
gathering information, was a government project. The Sixth Amendment was violated 
because the government knowingly exploited an opportunity to question a postindictment 
defendant in the absence of counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); see infra 
note 29 and accompanying text. Li's distinction of Moulton, that the informant there wore a 
wire at government request and was thus subject to more control than the informant in Li, is 
unpersuasive. See Li, 55 F.3d at 328 (distinguishing Moulton). Mou/ton's rationale was based 
on state action, not control. 474 U.S. at 171 ("[A]t the very least, the prosecutor and police 
have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes 
the protection afforded by the right to counsel."); see also Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75; Craig 
M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffman, "Be Careful What You Ask For": The 2000 Presidential 
Election, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 76 IND. L.J. 889, 923 
(2001) (arguing that Henry was an expansive rights case because it held that the Sixth 
Amendment was violated despite the government's express instruction to the informant not 
to ask questions). 
23. The state action doctrine applies to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
provides that "no state shall" infringe certain rights. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
619 (2000). 
24. See United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that govern­
ment was not responsible for jailhouse informant, even though informant might be an agent 
under traditional agency test); Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld & Sheri Klintworth, Right to Counsel, 
89 GEO. L.J. 1485, 1486-87 (2001) ("[The Massiah] prohibition applies both to police and to 
individuals used by the police to gain information."); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 162 (1986) (noting consistency between state and federal involuntary confession juris­
prudence and state action doctrine); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1980) (holding 
that habeas corpus relief requires showing state action in violation of Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel). 
25. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 & n.12 (1985). 
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citizen has undertaken to question the defendant <}bout the crime and 
furnished this information to the prosecution.2 6 The Court laid down 
the standard in Henry: the government is responsible for acts that it 
"must have known" will lead to rights violations.2 7  Similarly, in Maine 
v. Moulton,28 the Court barred "knowing exploitation by the state of 
an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being pres­
ent. "2 9 As for state action, and unlike for commercial agency, 3 0  the 
focus here is on the principal's motivation, and not on objective 
appearance; the aim of the rule is "to assure that constitutional stan­
dards are invoked 'when it can be said that the State is responsible for 
the specific conduct' "3 1 that violates the defendant's right to counsel.3 2 
26. See, e.g., Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he fact that [the 
informant] wanted to help the police solve a murder case does not necessarily make her an 
agent for Sixth Amendment purposes."); United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 
1997) (noting requirement to distinguish between deputized agent and entrepreneur); 
Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1 120 (Pa. 1998) (distinguishing standing 
agreement from "the case in which an inmate unexpectedly comes forward with incriminat­
ing information . . . .  "); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 21 n.91. 
27. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980). Following Henry, there has been 
some doubt about the requisite state of mind for the violation. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET 
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.4(g) (2d ed. 1999). This Note advocates following Henry's 
"must have known" standard, which neither finds a constitutional violation for negligence 
nor requires purpose instead of knowledge. See United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (holding government awareness of informant's propensity sufficient to confer 
government responsibility for placing detainee in cell with him); United States v. Johnson, 
196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 874 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (holding that government was responsible if it 
" intentionally created" or "knowingly exploited" situation); cf Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 
1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Where government officials must have known that a defendant 
will make incriminating statements about a charged crime, their interrogation . . .  clearly 
violates the Sixth Amendment."). 
28. 474 U.S. 159 (1985). 
29. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176. 
30. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958) ("Apparent Authority"). 
31. Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 
(2001) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). 
32. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171; United States v. Bender, 221 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 
2000) (applying "knowing exploitation" standard in a case involving an undercover officer). 
It is interesting to note that the Sixth Amendment, unlike the Fourth Amendment, 
confers a right expressly associated with trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .  " (emphasis 
added)). Indeed, Massiah speaks of the "use in evidence" as the violation, United States v. 
Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, 204, although it also suggests that "secret interrogation" itself is a 
violation, id. at 205. Later cases appear to have clarified that the Sixth Amendment forbids 
government-endorsed questioning in the absence of defense counsel in pursuit of its adver­
sarial case - a bar that is, of course, enforced by exclusion of the evidence at trial. See 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (holding that right is violated where "the po­
lice and their informant took some action . . .  designed deliberately to elicit incriminating 
remarks"); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (holding that the government 
violated the right "[b]y intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make 
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel"); see also United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (holding that the right to counsel can be violated at "critical stages," 
beyond actual trial). 
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Two factors emtrge from discussions of government responsibility: 
agreement and targeting. The first factor is that the government and 
the informant have agreed that the informant will provide the 
government with information about fellow inmates.3  Among courts 
that emphasize agreement, different courts place emphasis on various 
dimensions of this agreement: for example, some courts are interested 
in the degree of control the government has over the informant;34 
others emphasize the benefit the informant gained from providing the· 
information - the quid pro quo.3 5 There remains the common strand 
among these courts of an agreement factor. 
Second, some courts look at whether the government has targeted 
this particular defendant. 3 6  Targeting, or singling out a particular 
defendant from whom to obtain information, is distinct from agree­
ment. The state can target a defendant in the complete absence of any 
agreement with an informant, for example by placing an informant 
who is known to be talkative in proximity to the suspect, without tell­
ing the potential informant anything.3 7 This factor recognizes that the 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991); Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1268-73 
(Pa. 1992) (finding agreement sufficient without targeting any specific suspect); Hartman v. 
State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Tenn. 1995) (finding error, although harmless, to admit state­
ments informant elicited from defendant after the informant entered into a cooperation 
agreement with the state). Although some cases involve informants or defendants who are 
not in jail, this Note focuses on the jailhouse context, where virtually all potential targets of 
an informant's questioning would have a right to counsel. 
34. See United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995); York, 933 F.2d at 1359. 
35. See Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 393 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring both quid pro quo 
and control); United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 344-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring an "ex­
press or implied quid pro quo"); Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding 
significant lack of control, lack of express agreement, and lack of reward); In re Neely, 864 
P.2d 474, 481 (Cal. 1993) (holding that informant must act as a government agent at the 
behest of the police and with expectation of receiving a benefit or advantage); Stewart v. 
State, 549 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 1989) (declining to find agency where detective agreed with 
defendant's grandmother to listen in on their conversation because she was not a paid 
informant). 
36. See United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 1997) (appearing to examine 
only targeting in finding no error in determination jailhouse informant was not an agent). 
37. Pure targeting cases are rare, because the primary reason the state would know an 
informant was likely to be talkative would be previous cases in which the informant agreed 
to provide information, giving rise to an implicit, standing agreement. Even if the previous 
agreement was decisively terminated, however, some courts have suggested that placing the 
informant in proximity would be sufficient. See Brink, 39 F.3d at 424. Police have been 
suspected of placing known informants in jail cells in other cases. A police officer in 
Washington testified that police sometimes illicitly placed "known snitches" in the cells of 
pretrial defendants to obtain information. In re Benn, 952 P.2d 116, 138-39 (Wash. 1998); see 
also United States v. Pelaes, 790 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the government 
did not intend to elicit information in agreement with informant, but expressing low toler­
ance for future "coincidental" placement of cooperating informants in proximity to indicted 
defendants). 
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government's attempts to circumvent the right to counsel need not 
take the form of an agreement with an informant.3 8 
This Note argues that either an agreement with the informant to 
provide information about fellow inmates or the targeting of a 
particular defendant is sufficient to show that the government is 
responsible for the informant's questioning, thus furthering its case in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The government, 
in agreement or targeting, has knowingly caused the informant to 
"deliberately elicit " statements from the accused in contravention of 
the Massiah standard. Part I argues that an agreement alone confers 
government responsibility for the informant's actions. Part II delimits 
the contours of an agreement sufficient to make the state responsible 
for the informant, arguing that the government is responsible for the 
informant's actions within the scope of the agreement. Part III asserts 
that targeting is also government misconduct that independently 
creates responsibility for an informant's actions. 
I. THE J AILHOUSE INFORMANT'S AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE 
INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT 
In focusing on the agreement, express or implied, standing or 
targeted, courts correctly discern that if the government deputizes a 
private citizen to gather information, that informant becomes an ex­
tension of the state.3 9 This satisfies the first part of the two-part stan­
dard for Massiah violations: (1) government responsibility; (2) active 
elicitation. The agreement allows the informant's targeting of the de­
fendant for elicitation to be imputed to the government.4 0 Thus, gov­
ernment officials need not have personally targeted the defendant. 
Section I.A argues that, under Supreme Court precedent, an agree­
ment is sufficient to confer government responsibility where it creates 
an "informant at large." Section LB argues that the underlying ration­
ale for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel - preservation of the 
adversarial system - requires that the government be responsible for 
creation of informants at large via agreements. 
38. As an egregious example, a Los Angeles newspaper uncovered a memorandum 
showing a prosecutor had covered for suspected police targeting of postindictment defen­
dants. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
40. To be sure, to show a Sixth Amendment violation, the defendant must also show 
that the government's informant actively elicited statements from her, individually - this 
inquiry is the second part of the test. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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A. The "Informant at Large" 
Courts that require targeting, refusing to find government respon­
sibility based on agreement alone, exclude a significant type of 
government circumvention of the right to counsel. By implicitly or 
explicitly tasking an inmate with obtaining information from jailmates, 
usually for rewards on a contingency basis, the government encour­
ages that inmate to question suspects who, overwhelmingly, have 
acquired the right to counsel, which vests approximately at indict­
ment.41 The government creates what the D.C. Circuit has termed an 
"informant at large" - the agreement does not, then, have to be 
targeted to a particular defendant to show government responsibility 
for the constitutional violation.4 2 
Soon after the Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment to 
bar the government's use of a jailhouse informant in Henry, the D.C. 
Circuit recognized that Henry forbade government creation of 
jailhouse informants at large when the court held that the government 
was responsible for the informant in United States v. Sampol.43 The 
informant did not apply for bail, according to the prosecutor in part 
because "his ability to demonstrate his good faith and his cooperation, 
seem to be enhanced, strangely enough, by his continued incarcera­
tion"4 4 - he was staying in jail to be a jailhouse informant. Pursuant to 
an agreement, the informant used "his ability to 'ingratiate' himself 
with criminals" to coax incriminating statements from a jailmate 
toward whom the prosecutor had not initially directed the informant's 
attention.4 5 Thus, the government had impermissibly circumvented the 
Sixth Amendment in deputizing an informant at large.4 6 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adjudicated a 
compelling example of this type of government misconduct in 
Commonwealth v. Moose.47 In that case, the district attorney had kept 
41. See United States v. Sampo!, 636 F.2d 621, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Commonwealth v. 
Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1119-20 (Pa. 1998); cf County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 
U.S. 44 (1991) (generally requiring judicial determination of probable cause to hold a sus­
pect more than forty-eight hours); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (requiring judicial 
determination of probable cause prior to extended restraint of liberty). This Note does not 
address the separate issue of the point at which the right vests. See supra note 2. 
42. See Sampo!, 636 F.2d at 638. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 636. Not only the prosecutor but also the judge had made clear that lenience 
was contingent on continued, vigorous, effective cooperation. The court held that the judge's 
actions did not confer government responsibility, but "merely confirmed [the informant] in 
the status of informer, and pledged him to 'go all out' and 'forge ahead on his own . . . .  " Id 
at 638. 
45. Id. at 636-38. 
46. See id. 
47. 602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992). 
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the informant in the county jail for three years awaiting sentencing for 
murder, pursuant to "an implied understanding " that the informant 
would elicit incriminating statements from his fellow inmates.4 8 The 
informant gained a delay in transfer to prison, and an implied promise 
of a good recommendation at sentencing. 4 9  Since " [t]he vast majority 
of people in the county jail are charged with crimes and awaiting 
trial, " and thus questioning almost any one of them on behalf of the 
government would violate Massiah, the court held that the lack of 
targeting was not significant. 50 When it implicitly agreed for him to act 
as an informant at large, the government accepted responsibility for 
the informant's questioning in the absence of counsel. 
That an agreement suffices to confer government responsibility 
even absent targeting is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, 
which charges the government with an affirmative responsibility to 
ensure the defendant's right to counsel, 51 in Massiah, Henry, Moulton, 
and Wilson. The Massiah Court articulated the basic principle: "Any 
secret interrogation of the defendant . . . after . . . the indictment, 
without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contra­
venes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal cases and 
the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime."52 Here, as for 
state action, the constitutional mandate to the government to conduct 
a fair trial, and not formal designations should control.53 
Applying this principle to jailhouse informants, Henry supports 
holding the government responsible for the actions of an informant at 
large. The defendant was indicted for bank robbery and was being 
held in jail awaiting trial when a government agent contacted a fellow 
inmate in the same cellblock who had been a paid FBI informant for 
some time.54 The government agent testified that he told the informant 
to be alert for information, but "not to question [the defendant] .. . 
about the charges."55 The informant then had "some conversations 
with " the defendant in jail, and testified against him at trial, for which 
the informant was paid.5 6 
48. Moose, 602 A.2d at 1267, 1271 & n.2. 
49. See id. at 1270-71. 
50. Id. at 1270. 
51. See Sampo/, 636 F.2d at 638; Moose, 602 A.2d at 230. 
52. United States v. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 
N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)). 
53. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 
n.4 (2001); supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
54. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 265-66 (1980). 
55. Id. at 268. 
56. Id. at 266-67. 
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The court explicitly disavowed a focus on targeting: "The record 
does not disclose whether the [FBI] agent contacted [the informant] 
specifically to acquire information about [the defendant] .. .. "57 True, 
the Court may have inferred targeting from the situation, but its 
approach focused on government misconduct, not a bright-line 
targeting requirement. 58 
The Henry Court did not articulate an explicit standard, but found 
three facts significant in establishing that the government had deliber­
ately elicited incriminating statements in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment as interpreted under Massiah. First, the informant was 
acting under government instructions on a contingency-fee basis. 
Second, the defendant was unaware that the informant was any more 
than a fellow inmate, and thus would confide information inappropri­
ate to give to an adversary. Finally, the defendant was incarcerated 
at the time of the conversation; "the mere fact of custody imposes 
pressures on the accused."59 The last two of these three factors are 
always present in the jailhouse informant context; thus, a violation is 
particularly likely in this context, and the government should take 
precautions to ensure that its actions do not circumvent the constitu­
tional guarantee.60 By creating an informant at large, the government 
secretly commissions an inmate to interrogate jailmates. It is this 
underhandedness, not the targeting of a specific defendant, that 
shocked the Court in Henry.61 
The Court made the government's accountability even more 
explicit in Maine v. Moulton,62 noting that "at the very least, the prose­
cutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner 
that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the 
right to counsel."63 Moulton held that police use of a co-defendant to 
gather incriminating information in the absence of counsel violated 
the Sixth Amendment, even if the accused, not the police or their 
57. Id. at 266. 
58. See United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 860 (N.D. Iowa 2002); supra note 
11 and accompanying text. 
59. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274. A second informant, who was not paid and had no 
arrangements with the government to report conversations with the defendant, also testified 
to incriminating statements. See id. at 267 n.3. The Court did not consider this testimony of a 
"neutral fellow inmate" to be a violation. See id. at 274-75 n.3. 
60. See Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 860. 
61.  Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75 n.3 ("This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo's words, 
'the constable . . .  blundered'; rather, it is one where the 'constable' made an impermissible 
interference with the right to effective assistance of counsel." (quoting People v. Defore, 
150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926))). 
62. 474 U.S. 159 (1985). 
63. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171; see also Gardner, supra note 3,  at 426-31 (arguing that 
Moulton best articulated underlying principles of the right). 
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agent, initiated the contact.64 Henry and Moulton show that the 
government must affirmatively guarantee the defendant's full enjoy­
ment of a right to counsel,65 an obligation inconsistent with generalized 
agreements that set up systematic questioning of inmates by 
government informants at large.66 
Several courts have mistakenly argued that the "listening post" 
case, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,67 justifies a targeting requirement.68 Wilson 
addressed whether the agent's role was passive or active and did 
nothing to change the standard for the government's role. These 
courts rely on various statements, often quoted out of context, from 
the following passage: 
As our recent examination of this Sixth Amendment issue in Moulton 
makes clear, the primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is se­
cret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of 
direct police interrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
whenever - by luck or happenstance - the State obtains incriminating 
statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached," a 
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing 
that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, re­
ported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather, the defendant 
must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, 
beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incrimi­
nating remarks.69 
Thus, the First Circuit argued, "it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's 
inquiries as 'government interrogation' " in the absence of targeting.7 0 
This Wilson language, however, supports two separate inquiries: (1) 
whether the government was responsible for the informant; (2) 
whether the informant's actions were sufficient to constitute deliber-
64. 474 U.S. at 170. 
65. See id. at 171 ("The Sixth Amendment . . .  imposes on the state an affirmative obli­
gation to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek [the] assistance [of counsel]."). 
66. See Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1119 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. 
Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Pa. 1992). 
67. 477 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1986). 
68. United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 345 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. D.F., 63 
F.3d 671, 682 n.16 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[t]he key" in Henry and Wilson was "whether 
the government directed the interrogator toward the defendant. . . .  "); United States v. 
Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 449 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Williams, 870 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Cal. 1994) 
(citing Wilson to support the assertion that "a general policy of encouraging inmates to pro­
vide useful information does not transform them into government agents . . . .  " (quoting 
People v. Williams, 751 P.2d 901, 910 (Cal. 1988))). But see United States v. Johnson, 196 F. 
Supp. 2d 795, 848 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (arguing that such interpretations are misguided). 
69. 477 U.S. at 459 (citations omitted). 
70. United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Birbal, 113 F.3d at 
345; Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting with approval state 
finding in Lightbourne v. State, 438 So. 2d 380, 386 (Fla. 1983), that "Investigator LaTorre's 
advice to the informant Chavers to keep his ears open does not constitute an attempt by the 
state to deliberately elicit incriminating statements"). 
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ate elicitation.7 1 If the government has encouraged an informant to 
gather information from jailmates, the first prong is satisfied and any 
elicitation should be attributed to the government action.7 2 
Some courts have relied on the Wilson language stating that a 
violation requires something more than an informant reporting 
"through prior arrangement or voluntarily," to argue that the addi­
tional factor must be targeting.7 3 These courts ignore the context that 
makes clear that the additional factor is the informant's active ques­
tioning of the defendant, not government targeting.74 Where the 
government creates an informant at large in the jailhouse context, it 
has taken action "designed deliberately to elicit incriminating 
remarks"75 through providing an incentive for the informant to ques­
tion pretrial inmates.7 6 Thus, Wilson stands not for the proposition that 
targeting is required in addition to agreement, but for the proposition 
that active questioning is required in addition to government respon­
sibility. 
Although evaluating an agreement is slightly more complex than 
looking for simple targeting, 77 it is of little use to have a bright-line test 
that looks for the wrong things.7 8 Yet, in the name of clarity, the First 
Circuit would endorse government creation of agents at large, and 
insulate it from their actions.7 9 The First Circuit has argued: 
The government enlists jailhouse informants often enough that it is bet­
ter to have clear ground rules for what they can and cannot do. Where a 
jail mate simply agrees to report whatever he learns about crimes from 
other inmates in general, we think there is not enough to trigger Mas­
siah.80 
This approach fails for two reasons. First, since the vast majority of 
inmates will have a right to counsel on the crime for which they are 
incarcerated, a general agreement with an inmate to gather informa­
tion about other inmates amounts to a systematic violation of the 
71. See Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1028 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1019 
(applying two-prong test); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that Wilson supports a 
two-prong test). 
72. See Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1120 (Pa. 1998). 
73. See Birbal, 113 F.3d at 345; Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(Edmonson, J., concurring); In re Williams, 870 P.2d at 1086. 
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
75. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). 
76. See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1 980); Franciscus, 710 A.2d 
at 1120. 
77. See infra Part II. 
78. See United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 874 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (rejecting 
bright-line rule). 
79. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 75. 
80. United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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rights of the inmates.81 Second, it is not clear why a rule that prohibits 
agreements to gather information while in jail would not be as easy for 
law enforcement authorities to follow as one that prohibits targeting. 
Some courts invoke a modified agency analysis to analyze 
government responsibility. It is not clear that this analysis, developed 
in the commercial context, clarifies matters in the context of jailhouse 
informants, but it certainly does not require targeting. A jailhouse 
informant at large meets the definition of an agent - one who acts for 
another by agreement and whose work is subject to control by the 
principal.82 Related to agency, several courts have remarked that 
control is important to the Sixth Amendment determination.83 
Control, however questionable a measure of government responsibil­
ity, does not require targeting: the government controls the infor­
mant's actions to a large degree, often offering direction about how to 
gather information,84 promising rewards for evidence gathered,85 
conferring with the informant on a regular basis,86 and, perhaps most 
importantly, physically restraining the informant's liberty.87 Similarly, 
respondeat superior principles have sometimes been applied to 
determine if an informant is acting for the government.88 These princi­
ples accord with an understanding of principal responsibility well 
beyond explicitly authorized acts.89 The question of responsibility is 
more akin to state action than agency law, but agency law imposes no 
targeting requirement. 
81. See Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Pa. 1992). 
82. See LaBare, 191 F.3d at 65 ("On strict agency principles, it could be argued that (the 
informant] became a government agent . . .  when he agreed to report on future crime-related 
statements of fellow prisoners and accepted direction as to how to perform this task."); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 14 (1958). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. York, 
933 F.2d 1343, 1359 (7th Cir. 1991). 
84. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980) (informant told to be 
alert to statements but not initiate conversations); LaBare, 191 F.3d at 65 (informant told 
"don't ask questions"); York, 933 F.2d at 1358 (informant told the type of information the 
government was interested in receiving). 
85. See, e.g. , York, 933 F.2d at 1358; United States v. Sampo!, 636 F.2d 621, 632-34 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); Moose, 602 A.2d at 1270-71. 
86. See, e.g., Sampo/, 636 F.2d at 638. 
87. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74 (noting particular susceptibility of incarcerated individuals 
to government coercion); H. Blake Sims, Casenote, Constitutional Law - The Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel - Admissibility of Testimony from a Voluntary Active 
Informant, 63 TENN. L. REV. 453 (1996) (arguing that state creation of reward system for 
information makes all informants state actors). While this approach undoubtedly goes too 
far, it is important to recognize the substantial degree of control the state has simply by 
nature of the prison context. 
88. See, e.g., York, 933 F.2d at 1357. 
89. See State v. Wells, 731 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Mo. 1987) (holding that police must take 
responsibility for acts within the apparent scope of an informant's employment). 
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When government officials encourage an inmate to collect infor­
mation from jailmates, they deputize an informant at large, commis­
sioning him to gather information from those the government is 
forbidden by the Sixth Amendment to question out of the presence of 
counsel.90 The Supreme Court has made clear that the government's 
obligation is to comprehensively guarantee full and effective adversary 
representation.9 1 This obligation bars deputizing an informant at large 
to question uncounseled inmates. Thus, the government must be held 
responsible for the informant's violations, regardless of whether the 
government intended to target a specific pretrial defendant, or simply 
hoped for information from inmates generally. 
B. Equality in the Adversarial System 
Henry articulates an underlying concern that the government is 
stepping out of its role as "arms length" adversary in secretly using an 
informant to question the defendant in the absence of defense 
counsel.9 2 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is grounded in the 
idea of equalization, balancing the resources and legal expertise of the 
state with an advocate for the defendant.9 3 This equalization has two 
related goals: the first is a belief that the truth will better appear 
through a balanced contest; the second is a concern for the moral or 
normative authority of the judicial system.9 4 The right to counsel vests 
as soon as the parties become official adversaries, because, as the 
Supreme Court has recognized, pretrial confrontations may be disposi­
tive of the outcome of the trial itself.9 5 Both concerns, finding the truth 
and normative authority, suggest that an agreement should be suffi­
cient to confer government responsibility and, indeed, may counsel 
against narrow construction of government responsibility for the ac­
tions of jailhouse informants in general. 
A targeting requirement in particular is inconsistent with the 
requirement that adversarial proceedings place defendants, as far as 
possible, on equal footing with accusers.9 6 Once an informant becomes 
90. See Sampo/, 636 F.2d at 638; Moose, 602 A.2d at 1270. 
91. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); Henry, 447 U.S. at 273. 
92. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273. 
93. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 403 ("[T)he Court's concern was to protect against 
government circumvention of the ideal of maintaining a fair balance between adversarial 
opponents . . . .  "); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 53. 
94. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-82 (1966); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the 
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 
GEO. L.J. 185, 187-97 (1983); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 43-60. But see Gardner, supra note 
3 (arguing that "privacy" is a primary goal of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence). 
95. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
96. See Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Pa. 1992). 
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a state agent, pursuant to an agreement to collect information, her 
actions weigh in on the government side - particularly in the case of 
the informant at large.9 7 The prosecution uses its resources to create 
representatives at large who can take advantage of defendant's lack of 
legal skill to extract incriminating statements or details from a number 
of fellow inmates.9 8 
While the information gairied may appear likely to be reliable, 
there is no indication that this is, in fact, the case. In a particularly 
infamous example, the Los Angeles Times exposed a ring of jailhouse 
informants who had developed a system to fabricate confessions.9 9 
Tipped off that an inmate accused of a serious crime was to be trans­
ferred to their vicinity, the informants used the telephone they were 
provided to call the police station and other information sources, 
posing as police officers, prosecutors, and reporters. They divided the 
inmates up, striking deals with each other about who would get the 
rewards for informing in each case. The Times documented at least 
three cases where defendants were sent to jail on the weight of fabri­
cated confessions.1 00 The Times also documented police and prosecu­
tor complicity with this arrangement.1 0 1  While courts have noted 
danger, they are oddly reluctant to translate the acknowledged fact 
that informants often fabricate confessions pursuant to implied deals 
with the state into a legal rule that gives the government responsibility 
for generalized eliciting of uncounseled confessions.1 0 2  Even where the 
informant does not lie, the government wins the case not by careful 
investigation but by taking advantage of the defendant's lack of 
counsel; this imbalance may well lead to false convictions based on 
suggestibility or bravado, a defendant fabricating or exaggerating 
claims to impress or gain the sympathy of a jailmate.1 0 3  Thus, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel assists the truth finding process even in 
97. See Moose, 602 A.2d at 1271; Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 76-77. 
98. See Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1120 (Pa. 1998). 
99. See Ted Rohrlich & Robert W. Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches Trading Lies for 
Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, at 1 .  
100. See id. 
101. See id.; Kevin Cody, Jailhouse Informants: The D.A.'s Ethical Bind, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 1988, at 5; Ted Rohrlich, Illegal Use of Informers Suspected in '87, L.A. nMES, Aug. 
17, 1989, at 2. 
102. See United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the infor­
mant "had ample reason to fabricate" but refusing to hold the state responsible for his ac­
tions). 
103. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (finding confession to prison 
informant coerced by informant's scare tactics, but admission was harmless error); Thurman 
v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Ky. 1998) (describing contradictory statements 
given to jailhouse informant); cf United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272-75 (1980) 
(finding that defendant's incarceration and lack of knowledge that informant was working 
for the government contributed to serious nature of Sixth Amendment violation). 
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the jailhouse informant context, and this value weighs against allowing 
the government broad latitude to circumvent it. 
Perhaps more disturbing, the moral or normative authority of the 
judicial system is undermined if it allows the government to regularly 
prove its case by incarcerating defendants and sneaking information 
from them in circumvention of the requirement that the government 
use its position not only to prosecute its case, but to safeguard the 
defendant's interests.104 In many cases, the defendant attempts to 
construct a defense with someone thought to be a sympathetic ally 
who is in fact a secret government informant.105 As Professor 
Tomkovicz has argued, it may be a sense of equality or fair play, more 
than anything else, that motivates Massiah jurisprudence.106 
That the Supreme Court has somewhat left aside the moral 
authority line of reasoning in other contexts 107 should not preclude 
considering normative concerns in this context. First, the Massiah 
context may be particularly compelling. The government must gain 
society's confidence that it is justified in taking the extreme action of 
depriving an individual of liberty; winning the trial by depriving the 
defendant of counsel undermines that confidence. 108 As the Court put 
it, " [T]he government has committed itself to prosecute, and ... the 
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is 
then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces 
of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive 
and procedural criminal law."109 Second, the Court has continued to 
look to the more normative rationale for due process protections in 
another, closely related context. In its reaffirmation of Miranda v. 
104. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 400-03 (discussing fairness goal); Tomkovicz, supra 
note 2, at 77 n.296 ("[P]ermitting the government to disavow responsibility for the conduct 
of those it has encouraged to obtain information offends the 'appearance of justice,' an inte­
gral component of justice itself."). 
105. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1985) (describing witness's 
incriminating statements made in the course of strategizing a defense with a co-defendant 
informant); United States v. Smallwood, 188 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing defen­
dant's incriminating statements made during a consultation about his case to a jailhouse law­
yer and secret informant); United States v. Pelaes, 790 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1986) (describ­
ing informant co-defendant's testimony that defendant urged him to testify in his favor). 
106. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2. 
107. See, e.g. , Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) ("Although our decisions often 
have alluded to the 'imperative of judicial integrity,' they demonstrate the limited role of this 
justification in the determination whether to apply the (Fourth Amendment exclusionary] 
rule in a particular context." (citation omitted)). 
108. See, e.g. , Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168-70. 
109. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972), quoted in Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170. Both 
Henry and Wilson rely on the need to preserve the adversary system. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 
477 U.S. 436, 457 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980). In contrast, 
Fourth Amendment cases of the same era were rejecting the fairness rationale. See, e.g. , 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). 
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A rizona,1 10 the Court noted that it was concerned not only with truth 
but also with curtailing government overreaching when it stated that, 
" [C]ustodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty."1 1 1 
While the legal issues are not identical in a Miranda case, the norma­
tive argument is similar: the government cannot conduct its investiga­
tions in a way that infringes on individual rights. Thus, the normative 
argument weighs against abuses of power such as creating informants 
at large. 
The underlying rationale for the Massiah and Henry line of cases 
does not support a targeting requirement. Both the pursuit of truth 
and the normative authority of the criminal court require that the 
defendants not be subject to questioning by undercover government 
informants at large, with free rein to question them in the absence of 
counsel. 
An agreement is sufficient to create government responsibility 
under the Sixth Amendment for the actions of a jailhouse informant. 1 1 2 
An untargeted agreement creates an informant at large, a sweeping 
constitutional violation, inconsistent with the government's obligations 
under Massiah,  Henry, and Moulton.113 The principles that underlie 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel require that the scales of justice 
be balanced both to better get at the truth, and to maintain the norma­
tive power of the criminal law.1 1 4  Targeting should not be required 
where there is an agreement. 
II. CONTOURS OF THE AGREEMENT 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of determining whether the 
government is responsible for the actions of a jailhouse informant is 
developing the level of agreement that endows the informant with 
government authority to ask questions of fellow inmates. Courts 
enumerate daunting lists of factors to consider whether the 
government must have anticipated that the informant will question an 
inmate whose right to counsel had vested. 1 5 It is possible, however, to 
isolate the core of the inquiry and prevent it from becoming the 
amorphous multifactor test feared by some courts.1 1 6  This Part exam­
ines the key factors that courts have discussed: scope, benefit, and 
1 10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
1 1 1 .  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
455). 
1 12. See supra notes 39-11 1  and accompanying text. 
113. See supra notes 51-91 and accompanying text. 
1 14. See supra notes 92-11 1  and accompanying text. 
115. See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir. 1991). 
1 16. See, e.g., United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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formality. It concludes that scope suffices to show that the government 
"must have known " the informant's likely actions, satisfying the Henry 
standard for government responsibility.1 1 7  
A. Scope 
Since the focus in this constitutional inquiry is on government re­
sponsibility, essentially akin to state action, it is important not to break 
it down beyond the simple question of whether, under the circum­
stances, we believe that the state knowingly created a situation in 
which it was likely the defendant's right to counsel would be 
violated.1 1 8  This requires an inquiry into the nature of the agreement, 
showing that it covered activities sufficiently related to jailhouse 
informing to expect government knowledge of the informant's prob­
able course of conduct. 
Where an agreement is targeted, such that it specifically covers the 
informant's obtaining information about a particular defendant, courts 
usually agree that it is sufficient to invoke government responsibil­
ity.1 1 9  The government either directs the informant's attention to a par­
ticular pretrial defendant, 1 2 0 or places an informant with whom it has 
an agreement in proximity to such a defendant.1 2 1  The government 
must know that this action will induce the informant to ask ques­
tions.1 2 2  Normally, instructions not to question the defendant are insuf­
ficient in this situation because they are predictably ineffective.1 2 3  
Thus, agreements accompanied by targeting are almost always suffi­
cient in scope to confer on the government responsibility for the 
informant's actions. 
1 17. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) ("By intentionally creating a situa­
tion likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of coun­
sel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."). 
1 18. See People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 238 (Cal. 1998); cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 74 
("An informant should probably become a state actor whenever law enforcement actions 
provide any encouragement to secure information for state use."). 
119. See LaBare, 191 F.3d at 65-66; United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 
1997); United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1 141, 1 152 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Benn, 952 P.2d 1 16, 
139 (Wash. 1998). 
120. See In re Neely, 864 P.2d 474, 481 (Cal. 1993) ("Circumstances probative of an 
agency relationship include the government's having directed the informant to focus on a 
specific person . . . .  "); see also Panza, 750 F.2d at 1 152 (finding no agency because agree­
ment did not require informant to gather information from defendant). 
121. See Stano v. Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding no agency 
because informant not directed to gather information from defendant). Some courts have 
upheld findings of no targeting based on district court fact finding, but expressed suspicion 
that the government was actually placing informants in proximity to defendants after closing 
cooperation agreements. See United States v. Cruz, 785 F.2d 399, 408 (2d Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Pelaes, 790 F.2d 254, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1986). 
122. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271. 
123. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 177 n.14 (1985); Henry, 447 U.S. at 271. 
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The scope of the agreement can also cover the jailhouse infor­
mant's conduct without targeting. This can occur, for example, if it 
creates an "informant at large."1 2 4  The court in In re Benn125 declined 
to infer government responsibility for an informant who had a "long 
history as a police informant and ... [returned] to that occupation 
after his release from jail," solely because no targeting had been 
shown.1 2 6  This approach fails to recognize the other possible source of 
government responsibility - a nontargeted understanding that the 
informant would gather information while in jail.1 2 7  If the government 
officials include in their dealings with the informant an understanding 
that the informant will continue actively investigating crimes while in 
jail, this understanding covers activities that the government should 
realize will make the informant likely to elicit information from fellow 
inmates who have a right to counsel. 
The scope inquiry ensures that the government is not held respon­
sible where it could not have predicted an informant's actions. These 
cases can be factually distinguished. For example, in United States v. 
Hicks, 1 2 8  an informant cooperating on an unrelated case was incarcer­
ated for a parole violation. While the informant had an agreement to 
cooperate in the investigation of the unrelated case, the government 
never asked her to gather information while in jail; indeed, the agents 
with whom she was working did not know she was in jail until she 
contacted them with the defendant's incriminating remarks.1 2 9  Further, 
she testified that she was motivated to inform in this case by a 
personal dislike for drugs and there was no indication the government 
knew of this dislikeY 0 Although she had an agreement to work for the 
government, it was not reasonable to expect the government agents, 
working with the informant out of jail on an unrelated investigation, to 
anticipate her actions, which were motivated by considerations of 
which they were presumably unaware.1 3 1  Courts have thus succeeded 
in distinguishing those agreements that are insufficiently related to 
jailhouse informing to put the government on notice of the infor­
mant's likely action.1 3 2 
124. See supra Section I.A 
125. 952 P.2d 116, 138-39 (Wash. 1998). 
126. In re Benn, 952 P.2d at 138. Even the testimony of a police officer that "known 
snitches" had been placed in proximity to particular inmates to elicit information did not 
suffice to show that the police had placed the informant in this case. See id. at 139. 
127. See supra Part I. 
128. 798 F.2d 446, 449 (11th Cir. 1986). 
129. See Hicks, 798 F.2d at 449. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
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Scope must not be interpreted so narrowly as to exclude 
predictable actions, even if the agreement formally excludes them. In 
Henry and Moulton, the government explicitly told the informant not 
to ask questions, but the Court refused to absolve the government of 
responsibility because the informant's actions were foreseeable.1 3 3  In 
Moulton, the Court also focused on the government's motives in so 
instructing the informant, which were obviously not to protect the 
defendant's rights, but to make the operation more effective.1 3 4  Even 
the Wilson Court appeared to concede that the police's instructions to 
listen only were insufficient to show that the Sixth Amendment had 
not been violated - the government was required to show that the 
informant had followed the instructions.1 3 5  As in agency law, predict­
able actions exceeding instructions are still the responsibility of the 
principal. 1 3 6  
Thus, to confer on the government responsibility for an infor­
mant's actions, an agreement must be sufficient to impute government 
knowledge that the informant likely would question defendants in the 
absence of counsel. This scope can come from targeting, but it can also 
come from other details, such as an agreement to gather information 
from jailmates. 
B. Benefit 
The promise or provision of a reward can be very strong evidence 
of an agreement.1 3 7  It is also true that there are cases in which the 
informant approaches the government for the first time with informa­
tion already gathered, and the government provides a reward (the 
"entrepreneur " scenario). Such ex-post arrangements can be factually 
distinguished from informal prior agreements where the government 
encourages the gathering efforts.1 3 8  It is the government's knowing or 
133. See United States v. Moulton, 447 U.S. 159, 177 n.14 (1985); United States v. 
Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
134. See Moulton, 447 U.S. at 177 n.14. 
135. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 460 (1986). 
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 230 & cmt.b (1958). 
137. See United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904, 910 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Surridge, 687 F.2d 250, 254 (8th 
Cir. 1982). 
138. See York, 933 F.2d at 1357 ("That inmates realize there is a market for information 
about crime does not make each inmate who enters the market a government agent."); 
United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding record supports finding 
informant not an agent where there was testimony that, during the relevant period, the in­
mate felt double crossed by the government and planned to make a deal with the defen­
dants); In re Neely, 864 P.2d 474, 481 (Cal. 1 993); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 739 A.2d 485, 
500 (Pa. 1999); Ramirez v. State, 722 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding in­
formation "in no way a product of any stratagem employed by the state" despite subsequent 
recommendation for leniency); State v. Carter, No. 21394-0-II, 1999 WL 305233, at *4 
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purposeful circumvention of the requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment, not its provision of a benefit, that renders it responsible 
for the violation. Thus, this Section argues that a benefit is a good, but 
not conclusive, indicator of an agreement. 
Some courts have erroneously reasoned that if reward implies 
agreement, the converse also must hold true: if there is no government 
reward, there must be no agreement. These cases fall into two catego­
ries. In the first category, a previous government informant provides 
information but does not obtain a benefit specific to this instance of 
assistance.1 3 9  The lack of reward may have a limited function as an 
indication that the agreement may not have covered this activity.1 4 0  On 
the other hand, arrangements may be informal and flexible; where an 
informant is rewarded more broadly for government cooperation, it 
may be difficult to point to a reward specific to the information 
provided from the defendant.1 4 1  Relieving the government of respon­
sibility without further inquiry misses these cases. Therefore, rigid 
insistence on a quid pro quo is not warranted. 
The second category of cases that take the lack of benefit to mean 
no agreement existed are those that refuse to hold the government 
responsible when it takes advantage of other motivations.1 4 2  For 
example, in Thomas v. Cox, 1 4 3 the Fourth Circuit found the lack of 
benefit important, upholding the trial court's finding that "conscience" 
motivated the informant.1 4 4  Informants may have personal motivations 
(Wash. Ct. App. May 14, 1999). There appears to be general agreement that the burden of 
proof of government responsibility is on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Small­
wood, 188 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 1999). 
139. See United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1 141, 1152 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Van Scoy, 654 F.2d 257, 260 (3d 
Cir. 1981). 
140. See United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 423-24 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that infor­
mant "denied receiving any promises or rewards for informing" in this case, which might 
show agency relationship was terminated); Panza, 750 F.2d at 1 152 (considering it significant 
that defendant stood to gain nothing through elicitation of information outside scope of co­
operation agreement). 
141. See Brink, 39 F.3d at 424 (noting that despite lack of specific reward, informant 
may have had "tacit agreement" with the government); see also Watson, 894 F.2d at 1348 
(refusing, mostly because of lack of benefit, to hold government responsible for acts of a 
D.E.A. informant despite regular contact with government agents while in jail and instruc­
tion about investigation of the defendant). 
142. See Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding citizen informant 
motivated to assist police); United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 448-49 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(finding informant motivated by personal crusade against drugs); Surridge, 687 F.2d at 253-
54 (finding no Henry violation despite police knowledge that citizen informant would proba­
bly elicit incriminating information and police involvement in setting up meeting, because no 
benefit or explicit instruction was provided); Stewart v. State, 549 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1989) 
(holding defendant's grandmother, who agreed to allow officer to listen secretly on a tele­
phone extension to conversation with defendant, was not a state agent). 
143. 708 F.2d 132, 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1983). 
144. Thomas, 708 F.2d at 135-36. 
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for providing the government with information; the government is still 
responsible for the knowing exploitation of this situation, 1 4 5  because it 
is the government that must abide by the Constitution.1 4 6  While Henry 
relied in part on the fact that the informant was paid on a contingency 
basis, this factor was only one part of the Court's determination of 
government responsibility.1 4 7  The government is implicated by any 
pre-arrangement with an informant to elicit information from a defen­
dant in violation of the right to counsel. Thus, while a benefit may 
provide evidence of an agreement sufficient to create government 
responsibility, it is not a necessary factor; both flexible, long-term 
agreements and agreements that take advantage of informant's 
personal motivations constitute government circumvention of Sixth 
Amendment guarantees. 
C. Formality 
Some courts have refused to recognize that an agreement that is 
not formalized may nonetheless lead to a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.1 4 8  Such a refusal is unwarranted. The Eleventh Circuit's 
decision in Lightbourne v. Dugger149 presents a problematic example 
of a court's refusal to credit informal agreements. There, the infor­
mant contacted a state investigator, intimating that he had information 
about the defendant's case.1 50 The investigator told him to "keep your 
ears open. "1 51 Two meetings ensued. The investigator testified that he 
understood that the informant anticipated asking for assistance in 
procuring leniency, and, indeed, the investigator agreed to talk with 
145. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (holding knowing exploitation of 
defendant initiated meeting with informant equal to creation of such a meeting); United 
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980) ("By intentionally creating a situation likely to 
induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the gov­
ernment violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."). 
146. Cf Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (holding "coercive police activ­
ity" necessary to render confession involuntary for due process purposes). 
147. See supra note 11 .  
148. For example, in one case the informant's attorney discussed the possibility of 
cooperation with the United States Attorney. The informant then elicited incriminating 
information from the defendant. They did not sign a formal cooperation agreement until two 
weeks after this conversation, however, so the court did not examine the extent of the earlier 
discussion. See United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981). In another case, not 
involving a jailhouse informant, the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court's finding that a police 
officer did not impliedly direct the defendant's girlfriend to gather information when he told 
her that she "was the nearest one to (the defendant], and if anyone could get information, 
(she] could." Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1998). 
149. 829 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1987). 
150. Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1019. 
151. Id. 
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the judge to arrange his bail.1 52 Ultimately, the informant received an 
early release on bail and $200 from a "general reward fund." 1 53 None­
theless, the court found no agreement: "Chavers's motives alone 
cannot make him an agent of the police even if the police knew and 
understood that his motives were probably self-serving and related to 
getting police cooperation in his own case." 1 54 The court was appar­
ently willing to ignore Sixth Amendment violations in the absence of a 
formal agreement for exchange. 
The Eleventh Circuit's approach is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's statements in Henry and Moulton that the state has an 
affirmative duty to guarantee the right to counsel.1 55 
Refusing to consider more informal agreements ignores the reality 
of these arrangements, where an implication can carry as much force 
as an explicit promise. As the Supreme Court has made clear in the 
analogous state action context, "[I]f formalism were the sine qua non 
of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing to the ease and inevi­
tability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism has never 
been controlling." 1 56 Unstated understandings that an inmate will 
receive benefits for information are one of the most common forms of 
informal agreement. When the government hints at a reward the 
informant values, the informant is strongly influenced to gather infor­
mation in reliance on these intimations.1 57 Moreover, where the gov­
ernment consistently rewards information obtained by a jailhouse 
informant, a symbiotic relationship develops in which the informant 
reasonably anticipates future rewards for future information, and the 
court should infer an informal agreement.1 58 Since jailhouse infor­
mants are unlikely to risk informing, which involves substantial danger 
to them, without a clear expectation of reward, courts should be par­
ticularly sensitive to such sub-rosa, informal agreements.1 59 
For example, in United States v. York, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that the government agent told the informant "the type of information 
he was interested in receiving; that statement was tantamount to an 
invitation ... to go out and look for that type of information."160 In 
152. Id. at 1029-30 & nn. 2, 5 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (quoting investigator's testi-
mony). 
153. Id. at 1019. 
154. Id. at 1021. 
155. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176-77 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264, 270-71 (1980). 
156. Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 301 
n.4 (2001). 
157. See Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1270-71 (Pa. 1992). 
158. See United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1991 ). 
159. See id. 
160. Id. 
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contrast, the Fourth Circuit refused to see a veiled promise in Thomas 
v. Cox, 1 61 when it held that a meeting between a state police investiga­
tor and the informant did not create an agency relationship. The 
informant met with the investigator, offering incriminating statements 
by the defendant in a murder case; the investigator claimed to have 
told the informant that he could pursue the inquiry or not - making 
no promise of reward.1 62 The informant nonetheless elicited several 
more incriminating statements, motivated, he said, by "curiosity, " and 
testified at trial. The trial court found that it was "conscience" that 
motivated the informant.1 63 The Fourth Circuit decided that even if 
motivated by an "unencouraged hope to curry favor," the informant's 
actions were not attributable to the government.1 64 In so holding, the 
court ignored not only the contradictions between the informant's 
story and the trial court's findings, but also the reality that police are 
in a position to offer powerful implicit promises of reward to inmates 
who are themselves accused of a crime.1 65 
Once again, shifting the focus from the state action analogy to 
commercial agency does not avail proponents of a narrow scope of 
state responsibility. A formality requirement also contradicts the 
common law of agency, particularly since "authority to do an act can 
be created by written or spoken words or other conduct of the princi­
pal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the 
principal desires him to act on the principal's account." 1 66 The gov­
ernment can confer authority on an informant to gather information, 
and thus become responsible for her actions, without a formal 
contract. Formality is not required. 
The overall contours of an agreement sufficient to confer 
government responsibility emerge in a relatively straightforward 
inquiry. The scope of the agreement must compel the conclusion that 
the government knew that the informant would likely question the 
defendant about an offense for which the right to counsel had 
attached. Evidence of a benefit conferred is probative but not re­
quired. The agreement is often implied rather than formal, but none­
theless can be sufficient. The critical inquiry is the government's 
knowledge, viewed in light of its affirmative obligation to uphold the 
Sixth Amendment. 
161. 708 F.2d 132, 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1983). 
162. See Thomas, 708 F.2d at 132 
163. See id. at 137. 
164. See id. 
165. See York, 933 F.2d at 1358. 
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958). 
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Ill. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN T ARGETING A DEFENDANT TO 
OBTAIN INFORMATION 
The situation discussed thus far, where the government agrees with 
an informant to provide information, thus in effect deputizing a gov­
ernment investigator, is the most common in the case law. While 
perhaps more rare, it is important to examine the second situation that 
confers on the government responsibility for the informant's actions. 
In this second situation, no agreement exists, ·but the government 
targets a defendant through placement proximity to an inmate who 
will likely inform the government of any incriminating statements. A 
number of courts have suggested that this action would be insufficient, 
articulating a requirement of an agreement.1 67 This approach is both 
unfaithful to Supreme Court precedent and at odds with the underly­
ing rationale of preservation of the adversary system. The correct 
focus is still on the government's responsibility. In agreement cases, 
the government agrees to, and therefore becomes vicariously respon­
sible for, the informant's questioning; in pure targeting, the govern­
ment has direct responsibility because it has engineered the situation 
to elicit information from a pretrial inmate. 
If the government is aware that an inmate is likely to elicit incrimi­
nating information, and takes advantage of that fact by placing her in 
proximity to a defendant from whom it desires information but who is 
protected by a right to counsel, it circumvents that right.1 68 As the 
Third Circuit has recognized, 1 69 placing an inmate in a cell with a par­
ticular pretrial defendant when the government knows of the first 
inmate's propensity to inform on cellmates 1 7 0 is analogous to the situa-
167. See United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A]n informant 
becomes a government agent for purposes of Wilson only when the informant has been 
instructed by the police to get information about the particular defendant."); Stano v. 
Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding no evidence of agreement, therefore 
no violation); United States v. Surridge, 687 F.2d 250, 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding no 
Sixth Amendment violation where government knew informant would likely elicit informa­
tion and apparently made special arrangement for meeting, but did not instruct or pay 
informant); see also People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 198, 238 (Cal. 1998) (holding that police 
arranging defendant's meeting with noninmate, cooperating girlfriend did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment because the police had no agreement with the girlfriend to elicit informa­
tion). 
168. See United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994); State v. Pierre, 614 So. 
2d 1309, 1311 (La. App. 1993) (discussing deliberate placement of inmate who had expressed 
willingness to provide information in a particular case in defendant's proximity as a Sixth 
Amendment violation), rev'd on other grounds, 631 So. 2d 427 (La. 1994). 
169. See Brink, 39 F.3d at 424. 
170. While this action should be sufficient to confer on the government responsibility 
for the informant's deeds, the second prong of the inquiry will still require that the informant 
actively question the defendant, not merely be a "listening post." See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 
477 U.S. 436, 456 (1986); supra note 20 and accompanying text (regarding two-prong test). 
This Note deals only with the first question: When is the government responsible for what 
the informant does? 
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tion in Henry. There, the government was presumed to have known 
that placing the informant in a cell with a pretrial detainee in whom it 
had expressed interest would lead to the informant's asking ques­
tions.1 7 1  In both cases, the government knew that the informant would 
likely question the defendant and report to the government, which 
would result in a Sixth Amendment violation. In Henry, the govern­
ment's knowledge came from its agreement with the informant; in the 
Third Circuit's scenario, it would come from background knowledge 
of the informant's propensities.1 7 2  This distinction seems unimportant, 
given that it is the government's intentional creation or knowing 
exploitation of "an opportunity to confront the accused without coun­
sel" that violates the Sixth Amendment. 1 7 3 
Cases in which the government is not implicated, where the infor­
mant acted on personal initiative, can be readily distinguished because 
of the absence of government action to place the informant in 
proximity to the defendant.1 74 It is therefore not persuasive to argue 
that the citizen's duty to report knowledge of crime precludes 
government responsibility for targeting. 1 7 5 There are at least some 
cases where the information is due to government manipulation and 
not good citizenship. In one case, a police officer testified that the 
state had sometimes placed "known snitches" in particular cells to 
gather information.1 7 6  In Los Angeles, where the Los Angeles Times 
documented widespread fabrication, prosecutors refused to create a 
central file on jailhouse informants for fear defense attorneys would 
see it. 1 7 7  A memorandum written by a deputy district attorney stated 
that one of the reasons senior D.A. staff rejected the proposal was that 
they "suspected that LASD (the Sheriff's Department) intentionally 
put jailhouse informants in jail cells with defendants from whom law 
enforcement could use a confession."1 7 8 Because police and prosecu-
171.  United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980). 
172. Cf United States v. Surridge, 687 F.2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1982) (arguing that an 
agreement is essential because, in Henry, the "key issue is the extent of the government's 
involvement"). 
173. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); see also People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 
238 (Cal. 1998). 
174. See, e.g. , United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 449 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding police 
who worked with informant were unaware she was even in jail, so her questioning of a 
jailmate due to a personal desire to fight drug traffic was not state action); State v. Payne, 
325 S.E.2d 205, 216 (N.C. 1985). 
1 75. See, e.g., Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1020 (11th Cir. 1987) (arguing that 
the duty to report crime means that "courts should be slow to discourage disclosures," 
announcing a rule that the government is not responsible for a violation in the absence of an 
agreement). 
176. See In re Benn, 952 P.2d 116, 139 (Wash. 1998). 
177. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
178. Rohrlich, supra note 101. 
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tors do sometimes knowingly use informants to circumvent the right to 
counsel and bolster a weak case, it is worth the trouble to inquire into 
the facts each time to determine whether the informant can truly be 
considered an entrepreneur or a good citizen, acting alone. 
The reason the government must be held to this high standard of 
affirmative responsibility is that the right to counsel is rooted in 
concern for equality within the adversarial system, balancing the 
judicial contest both to ensure that the truth is reached and that the 
defendant is treated with basic fairness.1 7 9  Just as the government may 
breach its duty through creation of an informant at large,180 so it may 
breach it by targeting a particular defendant with an unwitting infor­
mant. Thus, targeting, even absent an agreement, is sufficient to 
confer government responsibility for Sixth Amendment violations, 
satisfying the first prong of the two-part test for Massiah violations. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the case law in this area reveals that the 
seemingly amorphous investigation required to hold the government 
responsible for an informant's conduct can be resolved into two 
overlapping inquiries. First, did the government have an agreement 
with the informant? Second, did the government target a particular 
defendant for elicitation of incriminating information? If either ques­
tion is answered in the affirmative, then the government is responsible 
for violating the Sixth Amendment. 
In the first situation, where the government has an agreement with 
a particular informant, sufficient scope is required to show that the 
government can reasonably be charged with knowledge that the 
informant was likely to elicit incriminating information. Agreements 
accompanied by targeting satisfy this scope requirement. Other fac­
tors, however, may show that the government intended the informant 
to act as an "agent at large, " and should be held responsible for the in­
formant's actions. Formality and benefits conferred serve as evidence 
of an agreement, but are not required. 
In the second situation, the government takes advantage of an 
informant's known predisposition to target a defendant for elicitation 
of incriminating information. No agreement is necessary because the 
government can be charged directly with knowledge that it has inten­
tionally created a situation likely to induce the defendant to make 
incriminating statements in the absence of counsel, which is a prohib­
ited circumvention of the Sixth Amendment. 
179. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1985); Tomkovicz, supra note 2. 
180. See supra Section I.A. 
2552 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2525 
A fundamental guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is equality with 
the state in the judicial process. Agreements, whether general or 
specific, and targeting, even with unwitting informants, undermine 
that guarantee. Both exercise the state's advantage of control over jail 
inmates, and therefore violate the Massiah assurance of a fair trial. 
